In its 1994 decision in Tolofson v. Jensen, the Supreme Court rejected theforum law bias inherent in the traditional common law approach to choice of law in tort. Underthe new rule, the law oftheplace of the tort is paramount. Although nobody regrets the demise of the traditional rule, the new predominance of territorial contacts has attracted criticism as reminiscent of discredited 'vested rights' thinking . This article is a response to that criticism, and a defence of the emphasis on private andpublic international values implicit in a territorial theory ofchoice of law. The author begins by examining the changes in the substantive tort law environment that createdpressuresfor reform at the choice of law level. She then considers developments in other common lawjurisdictions, finding the Supreme Court's 'neo-territoriality' to be consonant with significant currents of reformist thinking in the United States andAustralia. Finally, she analyses the implications of a territorial approach to choice of law in products liability claims. She concludes that the place where the defective product is distributed and causes injury has the predominant territorial nexusfor choice of lawpurposes, and that that law should be applied even if the law of the place where the defective' product was designed and manufactured is more favourable to recovery. Territorial analysis does not, however, foreclose a more open-ended choice of law resolution in cases where the place ofinjury or the residence of the victim do not coincide with theplace ofdistribution of theproduct, andthe victim had no direct or indirect relationship with the transaction through which the product entered the market.
Dans sa décision de 1994, dans Tolofson c. Jensen, la Cour suprême a rejeté le préjugéfavorable à la loi du for qui était inhérent à l'approche traditionnelle de la common law sur les conflits de lois en responsabilité délictuelle. Selon la nouvelle règle, c'est la loi du lieu du délit qui est suprême. Bien que personne ne regrette la disparition de la règle traditionnelle, des critiques se sontfait entendre sur la nouvelle prédominance accordée au lien territorial, vu comme une réminescence d'une philosophie de «droits acquis», maintenant discréditée. Cet article répond à ces critiques; il défend l'accent mis sur les valeurs du droit internationalprivéetpublic quisont implicites dans unethéorie desconflits de lois axée sur la territorialité. " [T] he common idea that the local law should be preferred in cases of doubt, is essentially a corollary of the local policy doctrine ; it is evidently a counsel of despair, which should be ignored in formulating the policies of conflicts law. . . [The locallaw theory] . . . lends comforttothe narrow minded, who may be inclined to deprecate the practical and equitable consequences that should control the adjudication of conflicts cases infavour of exaggerated localpolicy ' 93 on the ground that they and the sovereign which they represent can do as they please. This view . . . is at the end ashallow and even brutal philosophy, namely, that law is power.1
Introduction
Canadian news continues to be much preoccupied with the Hehns-Burton Ace, signed into law by United States President Clinton on 12 March 1996. Entitled the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995, the aim ofthe legislation is to forcepolitical and economic change inCubaby penalizing foreign nationals who dobusiness in thatcountry.3 UnderTitle III, United States nationals whose Cuban properties were confiscated by the Castro government in 1959 are authorized to bring suit for compensation against any third party national who "traffics" in thoseproperties .4 UnderTitle N, the State Department is empowered to bar "traffickers" from entry, into the -United States, with "trafficker" defined broadly to include senior corporate executives, controlling shareholders and their spouses and minor dependents.5 ' Reaction to the United States initiative has been sharply critical from the outset . The Act is seen as an excessive extraterritorial assertion ofUnitedStates domestic policy, antithetical to customary international law and violative ofthe 4 Title III was to have taken effect on 1 Aug 1996, but the Act authorizes the United States President to suspend its effectiveness for successive periods of up to six months by certifying to Congress that the suspension is in the national interest and will expedite a "transition to democracy" in Cuba. President Clinton exercised his suspension power on 16 July 1996and againon 3 Jan 1997for successive six monthperiods . See "Clinton's Cuba move criticized as both too harsh and too soft" CP-AP, Ottawa (4 Jan 1997).
5 Title IV is in effect. Thusfar, executives (and their families) of only one Canadian company (Sherritt International) have been advised that they are barred from entry to the United States . A Mexican holding company also has been targeted. See United States commitmentto its trading partners .6 Canadihas beenaparticularly outspoken opponent? retaliating with "blocking legislation" barring the enforcement ofHelms-Burtonjudgments inCanada, and "claw-back legislation" entitling Canadians to claim amounts recovered against them under Helms Burton inthe United States inp sroceedingsin Canada against the local subsidiaries of United States companies.
The Helms-Burton controversy affords a dramatic example of an issue germane to this paper : the appropriate allocation of law-making authority among sovereign states . The resolution ofthat problem is afunction oftime and context. But the strong condemnation of Helms-Burton suggests that there continues to belittle tolerance in today's worldfortheaggressiveextraterritorial assertion of domestic policy . With global economic integration proceeding apace, such opposition may seem paradoxical. After all, economic integration is thought to be transforming classical notions of the inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction.9 But the modern pooling and transfer of sovereign power has occurred volitionally, through the conclusion of rulesbasedbilateral and multilateral conventions . Because the unilateralassertion of extraterritorial authority threatens to undermine confidence in the always fragile process of consensus-building, it must attract opposition.
The Supreme Court's recent revolutionary jurisprudence in the private international law field reflects a like commitment to traditional principles of 6The Inter-American Juridical Committee has concluded, notunexpectedly, that the Helms-Burton Act "does not conform to international law ." See (1996) 35 International LegalMaterials 1322. See also Lowenfieldsupra footnote 3 at 430-432. The United States government's official justification for Title III, as stated in the Helms-Burton Act itself, rests on a combination of the controversial "effects" and "passive personality" bases of international prescriptive jurisdiction : "Sec. 301 (9). International law recognizes that a nation hasthe ability to provide for rules oflaw with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory. (10) the United States Government has an obligation to its citizens to provide protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens, including the provision of private remedies ."
7 Mexico and the European Community also expressed strong opposition to the Helms-Burton legislation, with the latter havinginitially askedthe WorldTrade Organization (WTO) to rule thatthemeasure violates international trade rules. But in April 1997 the EU and the United States agreed to suspend some provisions ofHelms-Burton inexchange for the EU withdrawing its WTOcomplaint. See Robert Russo, "Sign anti-Cuba agreement or else, U.S. official warns Canada" CP, Washington (16 April 1997) .
8 An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, S.C. 1996, c. 28 [Bill C-541996] (amending R.S.C 1985,c. F-29), royalassent 28Nov 1996, proclaimed inforce 1 Jan 1997. A challenge under NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) would be amore effective counter-measure butitalso wouldbe amorepolitically provocative one. Although Canada has notruledoutthatpossibility, neither has itproceeded . See M. Logan, "Canadian law to counter possible U.S. court action ineffective : Experts" CP, Ottawa (4 Jan 1997).
9 See, e.g., J.P. Trachtman, "The International Economic Law Revolution" (1996) 17 U. Pa. J. Int'1 Bus . L. 33 at 47-48 . sovereign equality and-territorially-restrained jurisdiction.10 The Court's reform initiatives began with a liberalization of the protectionist nineteenth century common law rules onthe recognition ofextra-provincialjudgments.11 Writing for the Court inMorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye and Huntv. T&NP1c, 12 La Forest G. ruled that Canadian courts were obligated constitutionally to give "full faith and credit" to sister province default judgments where there is a "real and substantial connection" between the subject matter of the litigation and the judgmentforum.,13Attheinternationallevel, comitycornpelledasimilarexpansion, albeit as a matter ofcommon law doctrine rather than constitutional imperative .14 10 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 doesnot fit comfortably within the Morguard/Hunt/Tolofson trilogy . In that case, Sopinka J. addressed the availability of anti-suit injunctions to restrain litigation abroad, and the relationship between the exercise ofthatpower and the doctrine offorum non conveniens . In relation to the latter doctrine, SopinkaJ. used the terminology of"real and substantial connection," the test adopted by La Forest G. in Morguard to delineate the territorial basis of subject matterjurisdiction over a foreign defendant. In so doing, he may have contributed to the continuingdoctrinal confusion seen insome ofthelowercourt decisions (infra footnote 17) between the question of whether jurisdiction is available in the first instance, and the second-level question of whether, if jurisdiction exists, the court should exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction on the basis offorum non conveniens .
11 English common law accepts only two bases of`international' jurisdiction for the purposes ofenforcing a foreign judgment: (1) residence and possiblyphysical presence of the defendant within the territorial limits ofthe foreign jurisdiction at the time process is served; (2) the defendant's consent or submission to the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreigncourt.See P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire andNorth's Private International Law, 12th ed. (London : Butterworths,1992) at 348 ff. PriortoMorguard andHunt, supra footnote 10, these rules were applied by the courts in common law Canada to both sister province and foreign country judgments.
12 Supra footnote 10. 13 Theuse ofthe term"full faithand credit" inthiscontextwillbefamiliarto Australian and United States lawyers whose Constitutions contain an express full faith and credit clause . See s. 118 of the Australian Constitution and art. W. s. 1 of the United States Constitution. But Canadian constitutional documents lack any comparable written directive. This did not deter La Forest G. He regarded the obligation as inherent in the very nature of Canadianfederalism, inthe intention tocreate anationalmarketfor the freeflow ofpersons, goods, and by implication, judgments. On-the origin of the term "real and substantial connection," see infra footnote 17.
14 I n the wake ofMorguard and [Vol.76
The Court's decisions inMorguard andHunt are equally significant for the territorial limits they recognize on the adjudicatory jurisdiction of Canadian courts. Over the last several decades, the statutory service exjuris rules in the common law provinces have been expanded to the point where no connection with the forum, or only the most tenuous connection, is sufficient.IS In Morguard and Hunt, La Forest G. confirmed that the exercise of 'long-arm jurisdiction' under these rules is subject to the territorial limits imposed on provincial legislative authority by the Canadian Constitution. 16 Although there had been some prior recognition of this, no general standard for territoriallycompetent adjudicatory jurisdiction had been articulated. In the wake of Morguard and Hunt, it is clear that "[i]n Canada, a court may exercise jurisdiction only ifit has a'real and substantial connection' (a termnot yet fully defined) with the subject matter of the litigation." 17 The territorial limits of domestic and foreign court jurisdiction, in other words, are now seen as coterminous.
is For instance, the Rules of Court in several provinces authorize service ex juris in the case of a claim for damage sustained in the province arising from a tort "wherever committed" (e.g., Ontario Rule 17.02(h), New Brunswick Rule 19.01(i), Manitoba Rule 17(02)(h)). This wording has been interpreted to support the exercise ofjurisdiction bythe courts in the plaintiff's homeprovince over an out-of-province defendant in respect ofan out-of-province accident on the theory that an accident victim continues to suffer pain, suffering and fiscal loss on returning home. The seminal decision inthis unhappy line of authority is Vile v. Von Wendt (1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 356 (Ont. Div. CQ. This is equivalent to saying that the plaintiff's residence in the forum is a sufficientbasis for the exercise ofjurisdiction overaforeign defendant, aproposition thatcannot standinthewake of Morguard and Hunt: see further infra footnote 17.
is The territorial limit on the reach ofprovincial legislative power over property and civil rights isreflected in the use ofthe attenuating words "in the Province" in s. 92(13) of The Constitution Act, 1867. See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto : Carswell, 1992) at 13-14: "[I]n a federal system it is obvious that a province, whose government is elected by and responsible to only those people within its territory, should not have extensive powersoutside its territory whereotherprovincial governments haveabetter claimto govern. Itisnotsurprising tofind, therefore,thatthe Constitution Act, 1867 couches provincial legislative power interms which rather plainly impose a territorial limitation on the scope ofthe power." In Tolofson, the Court decisively rejected the lex fori orientation of the traditional approach, replacing it with a forum-neutral choice of law rule in which territorial contacts dominate. Indeed, in the interprovincial context, the law of the place of the tort now applies exclusively . 22 And while some room was conceded for the operation of a public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule at the international level, it was thought that such cases would be rare.
is Supra footnote 10. 62. See now, Art. 3126 C.C.Q. adopting the lex loci delicti as the generalchoice oflaw rule, subject to exceptions, including acommon residence exception (proviso to art. 3126, infra footnote 90) and an alternative reference rule in products liability claims (art. 3128, infra footnote 119). 21 Under the first part of the rule, in order to sue for a tort committed abroad, the plaintiff had to show that the "wrong" was "of such a character that it would have been actionable ifcommitted" within the forum . Phillips v. Eyre, supra footnote 20 at 28-29. Under the secondpart ofthe rule, the law of the place where the defendant actedalso had arole to play: the defendant's "act must not have beenjustifiable where itwas done."Ibid. However, that role was interpreted so as to make the lexfori the governing law once nonjustifiability undertheplace ofacting was shown: problems, he stressed, a court is not concerned with "interest balancing" in the substantive tort law sense, but with the "structural problem" ofallocating law making authority among territorially-defined sovereigns 24 From the general international law principle that a state has exclusive law making authority within its own territory, La Forest G. regarded it as axiomatic "that, at least as a general rule, the law to be applied in torts is the law of the place where the activity occurred, i.e., the lexlocidellcci .
The theoretical arguments favouring aterritorial principle also responded to traditionalconflicts values ("certainty," "predictability," interjurisdictional "harmony" of result, the facilitation of transnational commerce, respect for "well grounded legal expectations"), values which hethought should be given primary emphasis in aglobal economic order if chaos were to be avoided.26 Within the Canadian federal system, La Forest G. thought thatmuchthe sameapproach should apply withone significant caveat. In the case of an interprovincial tort claim, "constitutional imperatives and other structural elements" made interjurisdictional harmony ofresult more desirable and more feasible so as to justify an exclusive lex loci delict rule??
Although no onequestions thatreform was overdue, the general reaction of Canadian commentators to the new centrality of territorial connections in choice of law for tort has been largely critical .28 The focus of the criticism is La ForestG.'s methodology, his avowed preference forclassic 'one-law-selecting' choice of law rules directed at the identification of a single comprehensive governing lawandpremisedonaphilosophyofco-equal territorial sovereignty 29 23 The connection to the Court'spriorjurisprudence was acknowledged by La Forest G.: "All ofthis is simply an application to`choice of law' ofthe principles enunciated in relation to recognition and enforcement ofjudgments in Morguard 29 By a "one-law-selecting" choiceoflaw rule, Imeana classic multilateral choice of law rule that seeks to identify one particular set ofprovincial or state laws to apply to an actor's conduct. Westbrook uses the term "one-law" values to denote the values that traditional conflicts doctrine, by generatingrules thatcreate areliableexpectationabout the applicable law, seeks to vindicate : (1) fairness to regulatees who might otherwise feel required to conform their conduct to more than one set ofpossibly inconsistent laws; (2) the production ofconduct thatis lawful by the laws ofat least one state ; (3) the facilitation oftransnational commerce and enterprise and the lowering ofthetransactions costsofsuch activities . See J. Westbrook, "Extraterritoriality, Conflict of Laws, and the Regulation of Transnational Business" (1990) 25 Texas Int'1 L. J. 72 at 79-81 .
For his critics, La Forest G.'s approach is reminiscent of mechanical "vested rights" thinking, long ago discredited by "local law" theorists in favour of a unilateralist perspective in which the overriding goal is the achievement of substantive tortjustice between the litigants, not the abstract allocation oflawmaking power among sovereigns.30
A related line of criticism accepts the Court's premise that choice of law engages issues ofstate sovereignty as well as private justice. But itis argued that state sovereignty requires tolerance for diversity as much in conflicts cases as in wholly domestic cases and as much within federations as internationally. From this perspective, La Forest G.'s emphasis on forum-neutral adjudication and deference to foreign territorial sovereignty is seen as negating the values of pluralism and diversity on which sovereignty is premised.
Conflicts theories are essentially cyclica131 and the fact thataoncepervasive way of thinking has lost intellectual currency over time is not enough to condemn its revival. It may simply signal the end ofone era and the beginning of another with the bright line distinctions that typify such transition points .
Tolofson represents precisely such atransition point,32 and itis the thesis ofthis article that it is a welcome one.
Part I begins with a review of the reasons for the extraordinary tenacity of the traditional lexfori rule in Canadian law and the changes in, the surrounding tort law environment that eventualfy created pressure for reform . Ithen analyse 30 The vestedrights theorists believed that a legal right`vests' when and wherethe last eventnecessary to create the right occurs. In tort cases, the theory yielded a strict place of injury rule. In Tolofson, La Forest G. endorsed a passage from Phillips v. Eyre (supra footnote 20) that has always been.accepted as a classic expression of the vested rights theory: "[C]ivil liability arising out ofthe wrong derives its birthfrom the law ofthe place [where it occurred], and its character is determined by that law ." La Forest then went on to say: "In short, the wrong is. governed by thatlaw. It is in that law that we must seek its defining character; it is that law, too, thatdefines its legalconsequences ." (supra footnote 10 at 1050) . Such is thethoroughness withwhich the territorial principle thatunderpinned vested rights thinking is thought to havebeendiscredited overthe last sixty years thatcritics of Tolofson regard its territorial approach as a sufficient ground ofcriticism in itself. The point is captured in John Swan's comment: "A judgment written in 1994 that adopts so unequivocally the vested rights theory of conflict is so unexpected that one could not be more surprised than ifwe had come across a practising alchemist: Whatcan one possibly say?" (supra footnote 28 at 948) . Legalrealismis widely acknowledged to be the impetus behind the rejection of vested rights theory in favour of a result-oriented jurisprudence . under which the advancement oflocal policies and local concepts ofjustice guides choice of law adjudication in the same way as it does other categories of domestic adjudication. For a recent re-evaluation of the logical entailments of the realist vision for choice oflaw, see M.S. Green, "Legal Realism, LexFori and theChoice-of-Law Revolution" (1995) A choice of law rule that directs the court to apply its own law is a choice of law rule in name only . Therein lies the principal source of the criticisms of Phillips v. Eyre .34 In giving a controlling effect to the lexfori, the rule notonly reflected a parochial attitude, it abdicated the choice of law decision to the plaintiff with whom the choice of forum rests.
Legal rules thatlack widespread respect rarely survive long. How then did Phillips v. Eyre endure so longinCanadian law? A large part ofthe reason must be attributed to the fact that most of the torts cases in which the potential for choice oflaw issues arose involved personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. This is an area in which, until recently, the legal regimes governing liability andcompensation were largely uniform throughout Canada and, indeed, North America. Where substantive differences existed, the conflict typicallyinvolved an`anachronistic' rule, e.g., adrastically attenuatedlimitations period or a statute barring recovery or raising the standard ofcare in actions by a gratuitous passenger against the`host' driver . In a climate in which the compensation and loss-distributionfunctions oftort law increasingly dominated, the pro-plaintiffpro-recovery bias inherent in the traditional choice of law rule was consonantwith prevailing standards of substantivetortjustice. The`better' more`progressive' law could be applied.
Insurance considerations also played a significant role. The defendant's fiscal interests were protected by the near universal enactment of compulsory liability insurance laws covering automobile accidents anywhere in the United States orCanada . Thepro-recovery biasinherent inthe application ofthe lexfori thus also served to further the loss-distribution objectives of compulsory insurance without inflicting any practical hardship on the defendant against whose interests it operated . 33 Substantial variations in theories of enterprise liability in tort and delict from one stateto the nexthave preventedthe emergence ofinternational or even national agreement on theoptimalproducts liabilityregime . Notable exceptions arethe EuropeanDirective on Products Liability (Strasbourg, 1973) and the federal products liability regime recently incorporated into Australian law as Part VA (ss. 75AA-75AS) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth .) (commenced 9 July 1992). Even in these two cases, however, member state variations have notbeen eliminated entirely.
34 Supra footnote 20.
Nodoubtfor these sameultimatelypragmatic reasons,the lexforiorientation of the traditional Canadian rule was also compatible with the results reached under the`modern' conflicts theories in ascendance in the United States . True, the United States courts had early on rejected the rule in Phillips v. Eyre as parochial in the extreme, replacing it with a strict lex loci delicti rule35 But the vested rights theory on whichthe lex locidelicti rule was basedeventuallygave way in the scholarship, and then in the decisional law of the leading states, to a variety ofrealist-inspired result-sensitive approaches inwhich traditional conflicts values were subordinatedto the forum policy ofcompensation for injury.36 While the new theories varied in their intellectual orientation, the results achieved reflected the same`homeward trend' as the Phillips v. Eyre formula.37
Indeed, one might argue that the "mechanical jurisprudence" produced by the Canadian courts underPhillips v. Eyre was to be preferred for its efficiency advantages. The new United States approaches shared a common antipathy to broad brush "one-law-selecting" 38 choice oflaw rules and acommon preference for open-ended instrumentalist analysis. As such, they tended to be labourintensive, requiring detailed adhoc issue-by-issue justification for the choice of law resolution in each case.39 As a statistical analysis has demonstrated, in practised application the differences between these approaches are not great. All three of them favour application of the lex fori, and since counsel who charge contingent fees rarely sue in a jurisdiction whose law is unfavourable to their clients' causes, the plaintiff tends to win. In a few instances whencourts do apply foreign lazy, they usually opt for asounder sister state rule inpreferencetoasubstandard lexfori. Sincemostofthe substantive rules thatusedto cause conflicts problems -guest statutes, intrafamily immunities and arbitrary monetary ceilings on wrongful death recovery -were substandard, the better foreign rule, again, usually favoured the victim." 38 This term is defined supra footnote 29. 39 Ad hoc resultoriented analysis, by its very nature, is also particularly resistant to accommodating concerns with`comity.' See J.P. Trachtman, "Reflections on the Nature ofthe State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility" (1994) 20 Canada-United States L.J. 399 at (arguing thatif the .rules allocating prescriptivejurisdiction are predictable, transparent and easily administered, they minimize transactions costs by facilitating "market agreements" thatreallocate authority to another state, with "market agreements" conceived toinclude other-sensitive practices suchas"comity"; conversely, unpredictable, result-oriented rules, or those that depend on an analysis of forumpolicy that has not yet been undertaken, by reducing the ability of states to predict what other states will do, also reduce the ability of states to arrive at such "exchanges") . The substantial uniformityintortlegal policy amongthe Canadianprovinces on which the stability of the traditional lex fori rule was premised changed radically with the emergence of statutory no-fault compensation regimes for personal injury suffered in automobile accidents . In most provinces, these took the form of"partial" or "add-on"schemes in which firstparty insurance benefits were made available to accident victims complementary to the tort liabilitỳ system.' But in 1978, the province ofQuebec instituteda`pure' no-faultregime displacing civil recovery and liability altogether for accidents occurring within the province.40 Visitors and residents alike were instead limited to a tariff of statutorily-prescribed benefits . The level ofcompensation available was more limited than what would be recoverable in an action in tort, particularly in the realms of general damages for pain and suffering and pecuniary damages for future loss of wages. Quebec motorists were still required to carry liability coverage for out-of-province travel and could sue and be suedbefore the courts in the jurisdiction where the accident occurred . But within Quebec`first party' insurance principles prevailed .
In this new climate, it was no longer possible for the courts to maintain a plaintiff and forum bias in choice of law in tort.41 Two different reparations philosophies were now potentially in direct conflict and one could not be said to constitute the`better,' more`progressive' law . Minimally, this required the exercise of greater self-restraint in the application of the lex fori and a correspondingly more respectful stance towards territorial connections . 41 As LaForest G. observedin Tolofson (supra footnote 10at 1044), the "fundamental weaknesses" inthe Phillips v. Eyre formula, begantoberevealedina seriesofOntario cases beginning inthe 1980sin which the victims ofQuebec accidents attempted to`top up' their no-fault' benefits by bringing a tort action in Ontario.
(c) Territoriality, federalism and concepts of state sovereignty
In speculating about the outcome in Tolofson,42 some Canadian conflicts scholars predicted that the law ofthe place ofthe tort would play a larger role, indeed that it might become the general rule if only "to retain at least the appearance of reasonable predictability ." 43 What nobody anticipated was that the new predominance of territorial over personal contacts would not be tempered by some sort of "flexible exception ."44 Thus, there was wide-spread surprise, even shock, when the Court ruled that the lex loci delicti governed exclusively in the case of interprovincial torts.45
La Forest G. justified an unqualified lex loci delicti rule for interprovincial conflicts on the heightened significance within federal systems of the classic conflicts values of certainty and interjurisdictional harmony ofresult:
The nature of our constitutional arrangements -a single country with different provinces exercising territorial jurisdiction-would seemto meto support arule that is certain and thatensures that an act committed inone partofthe country willbegiven the same legal effect throughout the country. This militates strongly in favour of the lex loci delicti rule.46
A territorial approach to choice of law in tort also had the advantage of "unquestionable conformity" 47 with the territorial limitsonprovinciallegislative power over property and civil rights imposed by the Canadian Constitution.¢$ Assuming that the constitution limits the extraterritorial application of forum 42 Tolofson v. Jensen, Lucas v. Gagnon, supra footnote 10. Tolofson involved an action in British Columbia arising out of a two-vehicle accident in Saskatchewan. The plaintiff was aresidentofBritish Columbia . Sowas the firstdefendant, his father, thedriver ofthevehicle in which the plaintiff was apassenger when injured. The second defendant, the driver of the other vehicle, was from Saskatchewan . Saskatchewan tort law imposed two limits on recovery: (1) in guest-host situations, the passenger had to establish "wilful or wanton negligence" on the part of the driver; (2) a one year limitation period for motor vehicleaccidents . Lucas raised a more`modern' conflicts dilemma. An Ontario passenger suedhis driver, alsoanOntario resident, for injuries sustained inanaccidentin Quebec. The Ontario defendant cross-claimed for contribution and indemnity against the Quebec driver ofthe other vehicle involved in the accident. At issue was whether Quebec's no-fault law (supra footnote 40) precluded recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant, and by the Ontario defendant against the Quebec respondent on the cross-claim, under Ontario tort and contribution principles respectively. 45 Supra footnote 22. 46 Tolofson, supra footnote 10 at 1064. 47 Ibid. at 1065. 4s On the constitutional basis for the territorial limits on provincial legislative authority, see supra footnote 16.
[Vol.76 law via forum choice of law rules, 49 it followed that an attempt by the courts in one province to impose liability under forum tort law in relation to activities taking place wholly in another province and involving out-of-province parties would give rise to "serious constitutional concerns ."t A lexfoci exception to the application of the lex loci delicti premised on the common residence of the parties within the forum had some "promise" of constitutional validity.5 l However, ifboth the lex loci delicti and the law ofthe common residence ofthe parties were capable as a constitutional matter of applying in such cases, this would"openthepossibilityofconflictingrulesinrespectofthesameincident "52 In the result, LaForest G. thought it best not to devise ajudicial rule that might raise "intractable constitutional problems" and to leave any exceptions to the application ofthe lex loci delicti to the legislatures to articulates La Forest G. regarded a territorially-based approach to choice of law as equally applicable in the international context. However, deference to a foreign country's territorial sovereignty is premised on "comity," not "constitutional imperatives" and otherfederal "structural elements ." 54 This difference allowed for greater discretion in the operation ofthe territoriality principle, a discretion which La Forest G. conceded might be needed to "to avoid injustice" in cases where the substantive content ofaforeign lex locidelicti was soradically atodds withthe lexforiasto implicate fundamental forumpublic policy 55Consequently, Ibid. at 1054. La Forest G. saw little place for aforumpublic policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule in the interprovincial context: "Certainly, where the place ofthe wrong and the forum are both in Canada, I am convinced that the application of theforum non conveniens rules should be sufficient [to deal with cases where the alleged wrong is not actionable as a tortunderthe lexfori] . Iadd thatIseea limited role, ifany, for considerations of public policy in actions that take place wholly within Canada" (ibid at 1054-55) . That greater tolerance for decisional nonuniformity may be necessary at the international than the federal level is accepted by even the most committed territorialists . See D. Laycock, "Equal Citizens ofEqual and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations ofChoice of Law" (1992) 92 Columbia L. Rev. 249 at 260 : "Domestic choice of law need not be flexibleenough to deal withtotalitarian states, revolutionary states, legally unsophisticated states, or states with legal and cultural traditions fundamentally different from our own." he was prepared to retain a discretion in the court to apply forum law in the international context though he thought that the occasions where this would become necessary would be rare56 .
La Forest G.'s willingness to infuse federal and public international law values into his choice of law analysis contrasts sharply with the prevailing judicial doctrine in the United States and Australia. In both countries, the starting point in analysing the relationship between federalism and choice of law is the full faith and credit clause in their respective constitutions57 That clause obligates each state to give full faith and credit to the laws, as well as the judgments, of sister states . Taken literally, the clause sets up an infeasible task. "To simultaneously apply the conflicting laws of two states is impossible ; to require each state to apply the law of the other is absurd; and"to let each state apply its own law repeals the Clauses$ The full faith and credit clause thus makes sense only on the assumption that there exist choice of law rules to identify when sister state law applies and when it does not. But while the clause "assumes the existence of Ibid. 60 In Canada, the Supreme Court's decision in Hunt v. T& Nplc, supra footnote 10 supports the latter approach in the context of the implied`full faith and credit' obligation in the Canadian constitution . At issue in that case was whether the Quebec corporate defendants in a British Columbia tort action were required to comply with a demand for discovery of certain corporate documents which they had been prohibited from removing from the province of Quebec by theorder of ajudge of the Quebec Provincial Court issued under that province's Business Concerns Record Act. The British Columbia courts were thus faced with a`full faith and credit' dilemma: should they compel production pursuant to forum law or yield to the laws of a sister province? On the assumption that the Quebec Act was constitutionally valid, the British Columbia courts .yielded: "interprovincial comity" compelled "the recognition of, and deference to the validly enactedlegislation of a province by thecourts of anotherprovince ." Hunt v. T&NPIc (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4th)763 at 767 (B.C.C .A.) . Writingforthe SupremeCourt, La Forest G.ruledthattheQuebec courts were obligatedby thefull faith and credit doctrine to respectprejudgment discoveryorders issued by the British Columbia courts . The contrary rule would allow the courts in one province to engage in a "preemptive strike" againstthe constitutionally competentexercise ofjurisdiction by the courts in another province. In the course of his reasoning, La Forest G. confirmedasignificant additional point:that full faithand credit does notrequire a court in one province to yield to sister province laws which purport to extend their spatialreach to coverthesame ground as forumlaw.Rather, theprovincially-constituted courts have full authority to rule on the constitutionality of legislation of a province that has extraprovincial effects in the forum. With this statement, Hunt laid the seeds for a transplantation of a full faith and credit doctrine premised on the territoriality principle to the choice of law context.
In Australia, the problem has been the subject of conflicting majority decisions in the High Court in recent years.61 In 1988, in Breavington v. Godlenian, 62abare majority ofthe Courtendorsed an unqualified lex loci delicti rule for interstate torts. Deane J.'s territorial analysis bears a marked similarity to that of La Forest G. His starting point was not the full faith and credit clause as such. Rather he saw that clause as reflecting a more general feature of Australian federalism: the idea that the same legal consequences should attach to an act or omission occurring anywhere within the Australian national territory regardless of where within that territory the matter was litigated.63 To achieve interstate decisional harmony, it wasnecessary that the sameconnecting factor -predominant territorial connection -operate both to identify the applicable sister state law in conflicts cases and to limit state legislative authority vis a vis other states 64
In an Australian constitutional context, however, there is a serious obstacle to Deane J.'s operative assumption that state legislative competence is subject to significant territorial constraints.65 Under the prevailing doctrine, the states are free toextend thereach oftheirlegislation to interstate activities andconduct even if the subject-matter nexus is a "remote and general" one and even if the result is to subject persons to the conflicting laws of more than one state66 If territoriality does not significantly limit the exercise of state legislative power vis à vis other states, it is difficult to see on what constitutional basis the courts are compelled to adopt a territorial approach to choice of law for interstate torts.
It is this reasoning that persuaded a differently-constituted majority of the High Court to later abandon the lex loci delicti rule . In McKain v. Miller, 67 decidedjust three years after Breavington, the Court reinstated the Phillips v. Eyre formula for interstate torts (it had never abandoned it at the international level), and along the way rejected any role for s. 118 of the Constitution in limiting choice oflaw68 Rather, s.118 enters thepictureonly afterthe commonlaw choice of law rules point to the application ofthe law of a sister state, and those choice oflaw rules are not themselves required to conform to the Constitution. As Deane J. later commented, the approach adopted by the current majority "goes a long waytowards convertingthe Australian legal system into anationalmarketin which forum shoppers are encouraged to select between competing laws imposing different legal consequences in respect ofa single occurrence ."69 .
The United States Supreme Court has arrived at much the same position as its Australian counterpart. Although initially sympathetic to the ideathat the full faith and credit clause obligates the states to apply one and only one state law in conflicts cases,70 the United States Supreme Court has since all butreversed its position . Today, a state is free to apply its own law even ifthis conflicts with the law of a sister state so long as somefactual connectionexists with the forum, and even if that connection does not relate to the subject matter ofthe litigation . The high point ofthis reasoning camein 1988 inAllstate Insurance v. Hague 71 Justice Brennan conceded that, intheory, full faith and credit requires eachstate "when acting as a forumfor litigation having multi state aspects or implications, [to] respect the legitimate interests of the other states and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty .-72 In practice, however, the clause was interpreted so as make the forum state's interest in the fiscal welfare of its residents qua plaintiffs a sufficient nexus to justify recovery under forum law in relation to out-of-state activity involving only out-of-state parties . The decision was widely interpreted as signalling the end ofany meaningful limits on the right of state courts to prefer local law and local plaintiffs in conflicts cases 73 6s Ibid. at36-37: "The laws ofthe States, thoughrecognized throughout Australia, are therefore capable ofcreatingdisparities inthelegalconsequences attached inthe respective States to the same set of facts unless a valid law of the Commonwealth overrides the relevant State laws and prescribes a"uniform legal consequence. This may or may not be thought to be desirable, but it is the hallmark of a federation as distinct from aunion . Far fromeliminatingthe differential operation ofState laws, section 118 commands thatall the lawsofall the statesbe given fullfaith and credit:thelaws oftheforumare tobe recognized as fully as the law ofthe place where the set offacts occurred . Section 118 would not be obeyedby refusing recognition to the laws ofa forum State and by applying only the laws of the part of Australia to which the facts occurred. A disparity in legal consequences attached to a set offacts cannot be eliminated by refusing recognition to laws ofthe forum which create the disparity . In our respectful opinion, section 118 does not prescribe the selection of the lex loci delicti or other extraterritorial body of law as the exclusive body of law governing liability for extraterritorial torts. The selection of the applicable rules governing liability is the function ofthe commonlaw; section 118 provides for recognition by the courts ofthe forum ofthe rules so selected." For a detailed critique ofthis passage, see Gummow (recently appointed to the High Court) supra footnote 61 The primary weight placed by the extraterritorial`regulators' on the advancement of local policy can obscure their common ground with the territorialists 75 Local policy need not be conceived purely in terms of local concepts of substantive justice. It can also encompass communitarian values associatedwiththefederal andinternationallegalorder, includingthe avoidance ofconflict with other states, the promotion ofreciprocity and the facilitation of transjurisdictional economic and other activities 76 There is, in fact, increasing recognition ofthe importance ofthese values in the contemporary scholarship and reformist literature in the United States and Australia.
In a study published in 1992,77 the Australian Law Reform Commission endorsed the majority's premise in Breavington78 that within the interstate contextthe same conductoractivities should carry the same legal consequences regardless oftheforumof litigation . To that end, theCommission recommended the enactment by all states of uniform forum-neutral choice of law rules, including a lex loci delicti rule for interstate tort claims . Ofcourse, uniformity at the choice of law level does not ensure interstate decisional harmony if the forum is free to interpret local legislative policy so as to give it a wide 74 1ndiscussing the differencesbetween"territorialists" and extraterritorial"regulators," Westbrook (a confessed`regulator') writes : "[T]erritorialists give muchgreater weight to the traditional international values and much less weight to local policies . That explains why the two views are so farapart, even though bothofthempurport to rest upon arespect forsovereignty. The territorialists' view is based on a greatercommitment to the system of sovereign states, and the deference that system requires, while the regulators' opposing view emphasizes the rights of each individual sovereign considered as such" ( extraterritorial scope. Consequently, the Commission also recommended the enactmentof a presumption making the territorial scope of state legislation coextensivewith the connecting factor forchoice of lawin therelevant substantive area in the absence of an express indication of a contrary intent.
In the United States, the conflicts scholarship evidences renewed support for the infusion of constitutional considerations into interstate choice of law analysis . Therecommendations range from the imposition ofmore potent limits on the extraterritorial application of forum law in interstate settings 79 to the creation on the Tolofson model of territorially-oriented choice of law rules premised on the values of co-equal state sovereignty.80
The developments on the constitutional' front reflect a more general "coùnterrevolution" (or at least a "resistance movement") against the`modern' consequentialist choice of law approaches thatreplacedthe territorial orientation ofthevestedrights theorists.81 Thereis agrowingconsensusthattheabandonment of territorial constraints on choice of law, whether constitutionally or common lawordained, rather than heralding abrave new worldofcommunitarianvalues, has resulted only in a parochial and unjust emphasis on local law and the interests of local litigants.82 A territorial choice of law is no longer seen as 82 For the insight that territorial choice of law methodologies are linked to thevalues of liberalism, and personal law methodologies to a more communitarian philosophy, see L. Brilmayer, "Liberalism, Community and State Borders" (1991) 41 Duke L.J . 1 at 3. In a somewhat similar vein, Westbrookviews the attitude of deference to foreign territorial sovereignty associated with the territorialists as indicative of a laissez-faire attitude to the regulation of transnational economic activity (supra footnote 29 at 93-94) . But, as Westbrook acknowledges, these arguments can be turned on their head. Thus, it-can be argued that the territoriality principle in choice of law advances communitarian values because it pays maximum respectto the principle of self-determination that underpins the division ofstates into territorially-defined units. Similarly, adherenceto theprinciple of coequal territorial sovereignty can be said to maximize the effectiveness of transnational regulation because it better ensures that other states will respect the regulatory efforts of the state having the predominant territorial connection with the particular subject matter.
inherently incompatible with the achievement ofsubstantive justice in conflicts cases . On the contrary, because it is a forum neutral connecting factor, it contains thepromiseofmore even-handed justice forbothparties. Globalization has also influenced the change in thinking . In an age of high personal and professional mobility, the significance attached to the concept of the personal law is in decline ; activity-related connections are increasingly thought to offer a more stable and predictable criterion for choice of law.
Even those who remain committed to interest analysis or advocate new alternative methodologies no longer urge the automatic application of the lex fori or the equally subjective`better law' in cases where more than one state is found to have an`interest' in having its laws applied . The focus is now on achieving a maximum accommodation of the purposes or policies underlying the laws of all the implicated states with any policy clashes to be resolved in a manner that "a neutralobserver will regard as fair and reasonable." 83 Although there "has not been a wholesale return to the old rules, there has been increased emphasis on the territorial principles that underlie the old rules ."s 4 After all, whatever its other deficiencies, it is generally acknowledged that vested rights theory at least tended to avoid the parochialism and systematic unfairness to defendants associated with classic interest analysis in the United States . TheUnited States is not the only commonlawjurisdiction to have retreated from excessive lexforiism. In its 1969 decision in Chaplin v. Boys,86 the House ofLords recast the Phillips v. Eyre formula to require civil actionability of the defendant's conduct underboth the lexfoci andthe lex loci delicti. The enlarged roleofthe lexloci delicti underthe newrulewas subjectto a"flexible" exception allowing the exclusive application of forum law in relation to particular issues in the interests of "justice" to the parties. However, a recent Privy Council decision gives increased prominence to both the lex loci delicti and classic choice of law methodologies.87 It is now clear that the "flexible exception" supports the exclusive application of the lex loci delicti, notjust the lexfori. Moreover, the exception can operate as a "one-law-selecting" choice of law rule,$$ that is, aruleallowing the wholecause ofaction, notjustparticularissues, to be governed by the lex loci delicti (or the lexfori as the case may be). More recently again, the whole area has been overtakenby statutoryreform endorsing the lex loci delicti as the general rule for choice of law in tort.89-(e) The common residence exception and localizing`relational' torts Today, there is really only one situation in which there exists significant support for applying the parties' personal law in preference to the law of the place oftort in motor vehicle accident claims . This is where the parties are both residents or nationals of the forum (or are both resident in a jurisdiction with 86 [196912 All E.R. 1085 [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 463 . In the wake of Red Sea Insurance, Dickinson questions the logic of retaining the requirement for actionability by the lex fori. As he points out, the only justifications for the requirement are certainty, simplicity, and predictability, i.e. the requirement acts as a filter to keep out controversial torts not recognized by English law. The admission of an exception effectively eliminates those justifications . 88 This term is defined supra footnote 29. 89 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, '1995, c. 42. Part III of theActreplacesthecommonlaw rules applicableto choice oflawintort(withtheexception ofdefamation which continuestobe governed by thecommonlaw).Thenewstatutoryrules give dominant effect to the law ofthe placewherethe events constituting the tort or delict occur, subject to a`proper law' exception. Where the events constituting the tort occurin different countries, theplace ofthetort is defined to mean : (1) in claims forpersonal injury orpropertydamage,theplace where theindividual orproperty waslocatedwhentheinjury or damage was sustained; (2) otherwise, the place where the most significantelements of the events constituting the tort occurred. The proper law exception can be invoked whenever it wouldbe "substantially more appropriate" forthe issues or asingle issue tobe resolved by anotherlaw.TheAct originatedin anEnglishLawCommission report (Private International Law: Choice ofLaw in Tort and Delict, Law Comm. No. 193, 1990) but departs sufficiently from the Commission's model to make the Report of "limited use as an aid to interpretation ." See A. Briggs, "Choice of Law in Tort and Delict" [1995] L.M.C.L.Q. 519 at520. Briggs ishighly criticalofthe new statutoryregime as unnecessarily complex and too`open-ended' in its language to be of much concrete guidance to courts .
[Vo1.76 substantially identical tort law policies) .90 Even here, however, the appropriateness of an exception has not gone unchallenged.91 In Tolofson, La Forest G. joined the ranks of the sceptics .
First, a common residence exception is typically rationalized on the basis that it is somehow`unjust' to the accident victim to apply the lower liability or compensation standards of the lex loci delicti in cases where the common personal law of both parties supports recovery . Viewed from a larger loss distribution perspective, however, where is the`justice' in a choice of law rule under which the compensation rights of forum residents injured in an out-of province accident turn on whether or not they have the`good fortune' to be injured by a fellow resident.92
Second, the arguments in favour ofthe exception reston a simple two party litigation model. In multi-party actions, however, a personal law exception can raise intractable problems of contribution and indemnity.93 Indeed, as La Forest G. observed in Tolofson, a common residence exception is apt to exacerbate these problems by encouraging frivolous cross-claims and joinders.94
Perhaps mostsignificantly, the common residence exception was developed in an era when the tort system comprised the main compensatory vehicle for personal injury inflictedin motor vehicle accidents . The emergence ofstatutory no-fault insurance regimes puts into question the ubiquity of liability insurance on which the common residence rule is premised. Under these newregimes first 90S.C. Symeonides, "Louisiana's New Law ofChoice ofLaw for Tort Conflicts : An Exegesis" 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677 at 716 . The existence ofjudicial and legislative support for a common residence exception was acknowledged by La Forest G. in Tolofson, supra footnote 10 at 1052 and 1057 ff. He listed the following well-known examples : in the United States, Babcock v. Jackson (1963) ,12 N.Y.2d 473 and Neumeierv. Kuehner, supra footnote 84; in England, Chaplin v. Boys, supra footnote 86; and in Quebec, article 3126 ofthe new Civil Code ofQuebec supra footnote 20, which reads: "The obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another is governed by the law of the country where the injurious act occurred... [But i)n any case where the person who committed the injurious act and the victim have their domiciles or residences in the same country, the law of that country applies ." (This exception does not apply to motor vehicle accidents because of Quebec's adoption ofano-fault system supra footnote 40.) As LaForestG. also observed, the Court's own decision inMcLean v.Pettigrew,supra footnote 20, overruledin Tolofson, itself lends supports to the common residence exception in its factual result though not of course in its reasoning. 91 Twerski,supra footnote 84 especially at 1359 ff; Martin, supra footnote 79 at 144-46. 92 Tolofson, supra footnote 10 at 1058. 93 For a post-Tolofson case emphasizing this point, see Stewart v. Stewart Estate, supra footnote 22 at para. 43. A strict lex loci delicti rule will not, however, necessarily solve all the choice oflaw difficulties presented by contribution claims in multi-party tort cases . See Silberman (1994), supra footnote 79.
94 Supra footnote 10 at 1061 : "If it isknown that the lexfori willapply, when residents of the forum are the only parties involved in an accident, but that the lex loci delicti will apply the moment any non-forum natural or legal person isjoined to the action, are we not encouraging those who wish to be governed by the latter rule to dig up third parties from the locus delicti .?" party, not thirdparty, insurance principles prevail.95Withthe liability insurance factor removed, it is no longer so obvious that there is no unfair surprise to the parties, specifically the defendant, in applying thepersonal law of the parties in preference to the law of theplace where all elements ofthe tortious conduct and its consequences are centred, especially if the parties are strangers meeting for the first time on foreign soil.96
The insurance backdrop to the resolution of interprovincial motor vehicle accident claims figuredprominentlyinLaForest G.'s reasoninginTolofson . On the international plane, he was prepared to concede some room for a common residence exception if only because the law suit was likely to take place in the parties' home jurisdiction, and there was some merit, in the interests of efficiency andadministrative convenience, to allowing the forum court to apply its own law.97 However, he cautioned that, unless "narrowed to situations that involve some timely and close relationship between the parties, an exception could lead to injustice" to a defendant who had insured his or her vehicle onthe basis of the liability laws of the loci delicti98 Insuranceconsiderations alsoexplainwhy LaForest G. rejected ajudicially created common residence exception in the interprovincial context99 As he observed, the "biggest difference between provinces now is in insurance schemes, and this creates problems of quantum, not of liability."loo Lossdistribution inequities generatedby conflicts ininsurance structures are capable ofbeing resolved efficiently and fairly only through legislativeintervention .101 In this connection, it is important to stress again that La Forest G. did not establish it constitutionally-mandated lex loci delictichoice of law rulefor torts . Rather, he cited concerns with unconstitutional overreaching by the lexfori as a reason to adopt a cautious territorially-based choice of law methodology. In other words, constitutional concerns informed the choice of law exercise, but they did not dictate the resulting rule.
Outside the motor vehicle accident context, a common residence exception is unlikely to be needed . The desired flexibility may be found 95 instead within the concept of the loci delicti itself, a solution that preserves the public and private international law values implicit in a territorial choice of law approach . As a prominent United States`territorialist' has observed, a "sophisticated terrïtorialism would often recognize that the law's purpose is to regulate a relationship between a group of people," in which event it may be perfectly sound to "reify the relationship" for the purposes of localizing the tort .102 Reasoning along these lines has appeared already in the post-Tolofson jurisprudence relating to liability for negligent misrepresentation between parties in a quasi-contractual relationship .
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II. Choice ofLaw in Products Liability Claims (a) Localizing the tort inproducts liability claims: place of distribution ofthe product and resulting injury
In motor vehicle accident cases, determining the place of the tort for purposes of choice of law is straightforward: both the wrongful act and the immediate injury are readily localized within the territorial borders of a single province or state. But in other fact patterns, the relevant connections may be more geographically dispersed. La Forest G.'s reasoning in Tolofson indicates that he was alertto thepotential difficulties with applyingthe lex loci delicti rule in such cases. Where a tort claim arises out of some truly transnational or interprovincial activity, he stated, "territorial considerations may become muted" and "other considerations may play a determining role ." 104 The postTolofson jurisprudence indicates that territorial analysis in such cases is effectively synonymous with a flexible "real and substantial connection" analysis,105 a point presaged by the 1985 decision of the Court in R. v. LibmanIO 6 inwhichLaForestG.endorsed precisely this approach indetermining 102 Laycock, supra footnote 55 at 323. 103 National Bank ofCanada v. Chance, supra footnote 17. 104 Supra footnote 10 at 1050 . For an example of the kind ofmultijurisdictional fact situation in which a strong case can be made for displacement ofa strict territorial approach to choice of law in tort, see L.J. Silberman (1994), supra footnote 79 . As she concludes: "[The vested rights] orthodoxy ofJoseph Bealecame undone for quite goodreasons the first time around ; attemptsto resurrectsimilar presumptive rules for particular kinds of cases .. . are helpful but do not fit all cases. Concerns for expectations and fairness to define the legitimate reach of legislative authority must also play a role."
105 For a recent judicial endorsement of this interpretation, see National Bank of Canada v. Chance, supra footnote 103.
106 Supra footnote 10.
the locus of a crime for the purposes of delineating the territorial reach of Canadian criminal law. 107
Eveninless territorially diverse fact patterns, localizing the tortcan present "thorny" problems.108 Where the place ofthe defendant's wrongful activity and the place of its injurious consequences do not coincide, La Forest G. indicated that "it may well be that the consequences would be held to constitute the wrong."log I n making this statement, he no doubthad in mind the Court's prior decision in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 11 o the leading Canadian authority on localizing a tort in products liability claims .
Moran involved a wrongful death action under the Saskatchewan Fatal Accidents Act111 by the widow and children of an electrician employed by a Saskatchewan company who was fatally electrocuted in Saskatchewan in the course ofremoving a spent lightbulb. His family alleged negligence onthe part ofthe manufacturer ofthe bulb. The defendant's manufacturing operations were located in Ontario and the United States and it had no . business presence in Saskatchewan, marketing its products there through distributors . The assertion of jurisdiction by the Saskatchewan courts over the Ontario manufacturer therefore dependedonwhetherthetorthadbeencommittedinOntario,wherethemanufacturer had`acted,' or Saskatchewan, where the defective product was distributed andthe injurious consequences ofthe defendant's actions were experienced. 112 1o7 InLibman v. The Queen, supra footnote l0LaForestG. endorsed ajurisdictionalrule that gives Canadian courts authority under s. 5(2) Ofthe Criminal Code over any crime that bears a "real and substantial connection" to this country, regardless of whether territorial jurisdiction is also available in another state . Since jurisdiction and choice of law are synonymous in the criminal area, his reasoning hasobvious application to private law choice oflaw analysis: "I might summarize my approachto the limits ofterritoriality in this way. As I see it, all that is necessary to make an offence subject to thejurisdiction ofour courts is that asignificant portion ofthe activities constituting thatoffence tookplaceinCanada . As itisput by.modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a`real and substantial link' between an offence and thiscountry, atestwellknown inpublic and private international law . Mhis does not require legislation.Itwasthe courts afterall that defined the manner inwhichthe doctrine ofterritoriality applied, and the test proposed simply amounts to a revival ofthe earlier way of formulating the principle . Itis in fact the test that best reconciles all the cases."
108 Tolofson, supra footnote 10 at 1050. 109 Ibid. And see also at 1042 where La Forest G. indicated that the same approach might be appropriate in defamation cases. InDickson J.'s view, localizing the tortwithin Saskatchewan was necessarytofound jurisdiction for two reasons. First, while the presence of the defendant withintheforumwas normally required for in personam jurisdiction, the occurrence ofa tort within the territorial limitsofthe court's jurisdiction constituted a well-established exceptionto that requirement, asrecognized inthe Saskatchewan rules governing service exjuris. Second, itfollowed from the territorial limits onprovincial legislative authority thattheFatalAccidentsAct should be interpreted as limited toactions arising outofawrong occurring within theprovince.Thelatter point lends supporttoLa Forest G.'s equationoftheterritorial limitsonprovinciallegislative authority withthe territorial location ofatortfor choiceoflawpurposes, supra textatfootnotes 47-50. On the impact of the Court's recent conflicts jurisprudence on the in personam jurisdiction of Canadian courts, seesupra text at footnotes 15-17.
[Vo1.76 Canadian (and English) authority was divided on the question. Some cases favoured the place of acting, others the place of injury . Dickson J. concluded that the place of acting had little to commend it. The production ofa defective product does not in itself constitute a wrong. It is the act of distributing that defective product into the marketplace and the resulting harm to users that engages tort liability. Nonetheless, Dickson J. was unwilling to accept injury per se as a sufficient localizing event . To do so might lead to fortuitous or arbitrary results . What was needed was a test that would reflect the significant interest of the jurisdiction where the consequences of the manufacturer's activities were experienced and the law of which was likely to have been in the reasonable contemplation of both parties . Thus, he formulated the following test:
[W]here a foreign manufacturer carelessly manufactures a product in a foreign jurisdiction which enters into the normal channels oftrade and he knows or ought to know both that as a result ofhis carelessness aconsumer may well be injured and it is reasonably foreseeable that the product would be used or consumed where the plaintiff used or consumed it, then the forum in which the plaintiff suffered damage is entitled to exercise judicial jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. This rule recognizes the important interest a state has in injuries sufferedby persons within its territory . It recognizes that the purpose of negligence as a tort is to protect against carelessly inflicted injury and thusthatthe predominating elementis damage suffered. By tendering his products in the market pricedirectly or through normal distributive channels, a manufacturer ought to assume the burden of defending those products wherever they cause harm as long as the forum into which the manufacturer is taken is one that he reasonably ought to have in his contemplation when he tendered his goods. This is particularly true of dangerously defective goods placed in the interprovincial flow ofcommerce.' 13 Dickson J.'s reasoning demonstrates that territorial analysis does not necessarily lead to the mechanicaljurisprudence associated with`vested rights' thinking . As incorporated in the first Restatement in the United States, the vestedrights theory required application ofthe lex injurii as the law ofthe place where the "last event" necessary to vest liability occurred . 114 But standing alone, the occurrenceofinjury withinajurisdiction, essentially aplaintiffnexus, does not seem to be a sufficient choice of law connection from the standpoint of the`coerced' foreign manufacturer.115 In contrast, the Moran test requires Restatementofthe Law ofConflict ofLaws (1934) §377. The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1969) does not completely dispense with vested rights thinking in products liability actions.While §145 employs a"most significant relationship' test asthe general rule for choice of law in tort, §146 creates a presumption in actions for personal injury that this is law ofthe place where the injury occurred. 115 See Brilmayer, supra footnote 82 at 23-24 : "Where the parties to adispute are from different communities, itdoes not seem fairto resolve the controversy solely according to the norms of one community or the other. The defendant should not be subject to state authority without a showing that he or she has somehow assented to state power." substantial connections between the defendant's activities and the place of injury . That approach respects both territorial and fairness concerns . If theplace ofinjury is ajurisdiction in whichthe manufacturer's products are purposefully or foreseeably distributed, the foreign manufacturer in effect has assented to be regulatedaccordingto thatjurisdiction's standards of liabilityand compensation. After all, if manufacturers want to participate in global trade, they must be willing to operate in the target markets on equal terms with local firms. The contrary rule would effectively license the manufacturer's home jurisdiction to set the global liability standard for injury caused abroad by products exported beyond its borders.IJ6 [Vo1.76 contemporary codifications 119 and in the scholarship. 120 I say`surprising' because a choice of law rule that systematically advantages plaintiffs and systematically burdens defendants prima facie raises problems of fairness . After all, nobody advocates giving primacy to the manufacturer's home law (whether defined as the place ofmanufacture/design ofthe relevant product or the place wherethe manufacturerhas its principal establishment) incaseswhere that law imposes a lower standard of liability or recovery than the law of the place where the product was distributed and caused injury . 121 It is only where application of the manufacturer's home law advantages the plaintiff that it is accepted as relevant in the choice of law balance .
In questioning the legitimacy of a plaintiff-favouring alternative reference to the manufacturer's home law, I do not mean to say that a state is precluded in international law from unilaterally imposing the burden of its laws on its citizens or residents, including local manufacturers, even when the harmful consequences oftheir misconduct or negligence are wholly extraterritorial.
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Ajurisdiction may wish to do this because it abhors the particular misconduct or itwants to lend its aid to aglobal attack on the problem or itis concerned with the potential injury to its international reputation from a failure to regulate. A topical example is the increasing tendency of states to extend the reach of their domestic criminallaws governing sexualmisconduct withminors toits citizens 119 See, e.g., art. 3128 C.C.Q., supra footnote 20: "The liability of the manufacturer ofa movable, whatever the source thereof, is governed, atthe choice of the victim, (1) by the law of the country where the manufacturer has his establishment or, failing that, his residence, or(2) by the law ofthecountry where the movable was acquired." This approach is nearly identical tothatadopted inSwisslaw,on which the Quebec rule is likely modelled. Onthe Swiss rule, see Kozyris, supra footnote 81 at 492, note 36. The plaintiff's choice is more limited undertheHague Convention on the LawApplicable to Products Liability 11 LL.M 1283 LL.M (1972 . Under art. 6, the plaintiff can elect between application ofthe law of the manufacturer's place ofbusiness or the law ofthe place ofinjury only ifneither place coincides with the victim's habitual residence ortheplacewheretheproduct was acquired . 120 Extrapolating from his theory of "principles ofpreference," David Cavers would allowthe plaintiffto choose the mostfavourableamong the law ofthe place ofmanufacture or design ofthe defective product, the law ofthe place wheretheproduct was acquiredand caused injury, or the law of the victim's habitual residence. In all three cases, choice is conditioned on the requirement that defendant "reasonably have foreseen the presence in that even when they travel outside the country and even whenthe victim ofthe crime is a foreign citizen .
The exercise ofthis form of regulatory authority, however, is grounded in a personal, not a territorial, theory of international prescriptive (i.e., lawmaking) jurisdiction. 123 As such, it is an appropriate connecting factor for the purposes of a unilateral choice of law rule articulated by the manufacturer's home state, as the only state possessing`personal jurisdiction' over the extraterritorial conduct of the manufacturer. 124 But the alternative reference rule typically is cast in the form of amultilateral choice oflaw rule, 125 i .e., one equally capable of being invoked in any forum, including the state where the product is distributed and causes injury . But that state has neither personal prescriptive jurisdiction over the defendant nor a territorial nexus to the defendant's activities. Although the defendant's activities have created a risk of harmwithin the forum's territory, thatfactgives the forum a sufficientterritorial nexus to apply its own products liability laws to determine liability for the resulting injury, not toprescribe application ofthe manufacturer's homelaw via its choice oflaw rules. Indeed, imposingthe burden oftheir more onerous home laws on foreign manufacturers is suspect on equal protection as well as However, ifthe domestic products liability law is silent on its territorial scope,the presumption against extraterritoriality militates against, its application to domestic manufacturers in relation to exported products that inflict injury abroad. In the United States, the argument thatdomestic products liability laws do not apply extraterritorially is typically advanced at the jurisdictional stage, in the context ofan application by a United States manufacturer to dismiss an action by a foreign plaintiff for harm caused abroad by a defective product on the basisofforum nonconveniens . In this context, the federal courts and the majority of state courts have decided that it is the country where the product is distributed and causes injury, not the state where the product is manufactured, thathas the greatest interest in setting the appropriate standard of enterprise liability . .) . However, the attractiveness of United States products liability laws is being steadily diminished by the state legislature-driven`tort reform' movement aimed atlessening`enterprise liability' through suchmeasures as: shorter timelimitations onsuit, statutory caps on damages, instalment inlieuoflump sum damage awards; stricterjudicial scrutiny ofthe quantum of awards ; sanctions on frivolous litigation ; reduction of awards through apportionment, contribution and changes inthe relevance ofcollateral sources of compensation ; limitations oncontingency agreements. See e.g. Weintraub, supra footnote 83 at 225, note 6. [Vo1.76 territorial grounds sinceit amounts toimposing atariffonforeign manufacturers competing in the local market with local manufacturers. 126 Not surprisingly, those who advocate the application ofthe manufacturer's home law where it imposes a stricter standard of liability or a more generous level of compensation do not base themselves on a territorial theory of choice oflaw but on substantive tort considerations, thatthat approach better advances the compensation anddeterrence goals underpinning products liability regimes at large. This was the reasoning in Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.127 An Alberta farmer suffered extensive injuries in the course ofoperating a hay baler on his family's farm in Alberta. The baler had been manufactured for the defendant in Iowa on order by its Canadian subsidiary and shipped directly to an Alberta dealership for sale inAlberta where it was purchased by the victim's father. The farmer brought suit in the United States District Court in Denver against the United States manufacturer.
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purporting to apply the`most significantrelationship testinthe SecondRestatement, 129the Courtresolved the choice oflaw issue in favour ofthe law ofthe`place ofacting,' the law ofIowa, where the implement had been manufactured and where the defendant had its principal place of business.
In concluding that Iowa law had the most significant relationship with the litigation, the court focussed on Iowa's policy, reflected primarily in the availability ofunlimited punitive and exemplary damages, "to deter,punish and make an example of certain dangerous corporate conduct." 130 The court conceded that Alberta alsohad an interest in "regulating conduct and commerce Since federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the applicable choice oflaw rules were those ofColorado, the stateinwhichthe DistrictCourt was sitting . And since the Supreme Court ofthatstate applies the choice oflaw rulesintheRestatement (Second) ofthe Conflict ofLaws (1969) §145, the "most significant relationship" approach governed choice oflaw. Colorado case law also requires application ofthe Restatement's rulesgoverning specific torts ; consequently the presumption insection 146 infavour ofthe place ofinjury in personal injury actions was applicable. However, the Colorado Supreme Courthadneveradopted achoiceoflaw rule forpersonal injury claims ofthe particular type in issue. Consequently, the District Court was not bound by prior Colorado precedent to apply the place of harm theory if, as it considered to be the case, the presumption was rebutted by the existence ofa more significant relationship to Iowa law (Ibid. at 642-44) .
within its territory to see that its citizens are fully compensated for their injuries ." 131 However, Alberta's tort-recovery laws were more restrictive than those of Iowa . 132 Consequently, "Canada's interest in protecting its citizens in the position of this plaintiff would be better served by applying Iowa law." 1 33 Further, since Iowa law was more favourable to recovery, "Canada can complain of no harm if its citizen's claim is tried under Iowa law." 134 This is boot-strap reasoning. It is self-contradictory to decide that the importingjurisdiction has a legitimate interest in regulating the misconduct of foreignmanufacturers that causes injury within its borders andthen to conclude that that interest is better served by applying the law of the defendant's home state. Moreover, the implicit arrogance is startling. While Alberta is not about to claim a violation of its sovereign integrity because its residents are able to forum shop to personal advantage in the United States, it mightjustifiably take issue with the court's assumption that Iowa rather than Alberta law represents the optimal tort regime applicable to defective products that are distributed and causeinjury within Alberta's territorial li m its .135 Although alltort regimesmay share a common concern with compensation, deterrence and corrective justice, the relative importance attached to these elements turns on the level of enterprise liability each jurisdiction considers appropriate in light of its own political, economic and moral values. Concepts of substantive tort justice, in other words, are time and context sensitive. 136
131 Ibid. at 644. 132 Ibid.The Courtidentified threepoints of difference : (1) whileAlbertalaw required proof of negligence in products liability actions, Iowa law provided for strict liability; (2) while both laws allowed recovery of punitive and exemplary damages, Alberta had a cap on such damages; and (3) while Alberta recognized assumption of risk as an absolute defence to tort liability, Iowa law regarded it merely as an element to be weighed in the comparative fault equation. In support of the second proposition, the Court referred to a 1978 trilogy of Supreme Court of Canada decisions, the main objective of which was to impose a cap on compensatory damages for non-economic losses, not exemplary and punitive damages. This minorpoint aside, it is undoubtedly thecase that punitive damages are less widely available and lower in quantum in Canadian law. In relation to the third proposition, it bears noting that Canadian courts rarely allow the assumption ofrisk defence and products liability actions do not typically engage the defence. Moreover, in Canadian law, both common and civil, causal fault reduces the plaintiff's recovery proportionate to fault whereas Iowa law, as the court acknowledged (ibid. at 643), bars recovery if the plaintiff's proportionate fault exceeds 50%. 133 In light of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the value of certainty in Tolofson, the courts could no longer, as they might once have done, apply the lexfori to get around any "perceived injustice or unfairness" under the lex loci delicti. 143 I n any event there was nothing "inherently unfair" about the result since it was brought about by "the application of the law in which the plaintiff resides, in which she sustained injury and suffered the financial consequences of the injury ." 144 (c) A public policy exception for dangerously defective products?
Is there room for a public policy based exception "when the defendant manufacturer has acted outrageously by, for example, exporting a dangerously defective product to the victim's state, the use of which is banned in the manufacturer's state ."145 Weintraubregardsthisasan "easycase" forrecognizing an exception . 146 Since "both the manufacturer's and the victim's state would wishto punish and deter this kind of conduct," applying the enterprise liability law of the defendant's state "advances the policies of both states" and consequently is the "preferred result." 147 Weintraub's assumptions are inherently problematic . Ifthe manufacturer's home state authorizes the domestic production for export ofbanned products, how can the defendant's conduct be said to be contrary to that state's policy? Equally, if the victim's home state allows the import and sale of defective products without sanction, how can it be said that it wishes to punish and deter the manufacturer's conduct?
Those who advocate the extraterritorial application of domestic products liability laws to cover injuries caused abroad by exported products sometimes base themselves onjustice considerations, specifically that itis wrong to apply a lower standard of liability and compensation to foreign plaintiffs relative to 141 Supra footnote 110. 142 I n Tolofson, supra footnote 10, the Supreme Courtreversed the long-established common law rule thatlimitation periods are procedural and therefore governed by the lex fori rather than the otherwise applicable substantive lex causae . 152 Kozyris, supra footnote 81 at 501 . extraterritorial application of domestic products liability laws). In the absence of an express legislative directive to this effect, there is no ground to assume a public will to regulate.
(d) Choice oflawingeographically-dispersedfactpatterns: contact-counting, plaintiff-choice or`real and substantial connection'?
In the cases examined so far, there was a coincidence ofthe place ofinjury, the habitual residence ofthe victim and the place ofthe initial acquisition ofthe product. If it is accepted that the manufacturer's nationality or residence standing alone is insufficient as a choice oflaw connection, then these types of cases are not really conflicts cases at all . They are essentially domestic cases within the natural territorial scope ofapplication of the products liability laws of the state of distribution and injury . 153
In cases involving more dispersed factual connections, is it still possible to identify a predominant territorial nexus for the purposes ofchoice oflaw? Is it even possible to analyse choice of law according to a territorial methodology? Or is this the type of situation which La Forest G. had in mind when he stated in Tolofson that in cases arising out of truly transnational or interprovincial activities and events, territorial considerations may become muted and other considerations may have to take centre stage? 154 Some analysts would have us altogether abandon a conventional choice of law approach in multijurisdictional products liability cases. The court should instead take into account the substantive laws of all of the places to which the events and the parties are connected -the place ofinjury, the place where the negligent conduct causing the injury occurred, the place where the product was acquired, and the home states of the parties (residence, place of incorporation or principal place of business) . As to each issue, the court should then select THECANADLAN BARREVIEW [Vol.76 from the laws of these jurisdictions "the rule of decision which most closely accords with modern products liability standards . "155 This kind ofad hoc anational methodology suffers from the deficiencies of any substantive tort choice of law rule. Concepts of tort justice are time and place sensitive . There is no such thing as an optimal tort regime in the abstract. 156 Lacking anideal standard, the forum is likelyto turn to the law "that most closely resembles its own unless the forum considers its own law to be outmoded or inferior, an unlikely outcome ." 157 Even ifamore neutral stance is attempted, the outcome is still unpredictable since the choice of the substantive law to govern each issue is premised on each forum's necessarily subjective ideas about the best approach to products liability. 158 In any event, those who urge the abandonment of a classic choice of law approach in geographically-dispersed products liability cases may be overestimating the difficulties. Once the manufacturer's home law is removed from the equation, there is a surprising level of common ground among commentators and legislators on the appropriate choice of law resolution. The debate is then centred principally between the place of acquisition of the productI 59 and the habitualresidence ofthe victim160 -With the place ofinjury given second level significance as a default connection to habitualresidence. 161 The rationale for placing the emphasis on the habitual residence of the victim (orthe place ofinjury in default) isplaintiff-oriented: itisthatjurisdiction which will "experience consequences its laws is designed to prevent ifwhat the residence considers proper compensation is not available ." 162 The rationale for focussing onthe place ofdistribution ofthe productis defendant and territorially oriented. As we haveseen, marketing aproduct within a state's boundaries gives that state a sufficient territorial nexus with the defendant's conduct and its consequences to support the application of its substantive products liability laws. 163 The ground of difference between the two solutions is not as large as might be thought. Those who advocate giving primary emphasis to the habitual residence of the victim nonetheless concede that it is an insufficient connection standing alone tojustify the application of that law. There must also exist a volitional nexus between the defendant's marketing activities and the applicable law. It is argued, however, that this should not limit the choice to the law of the place where the actual defective product was acquired . It is enough if the "same or similar products" are distributed by the relevant manufacturer in the victim's home market through "ordinary commercial channels ." 164 In these circumstances, it is not "unfair" to subject the defendant to the victim's home law since "it is fortuitous if a product that the victim might have purchased at home is in fact purchased elsewhere."165 Some would even liberalize the defendant nexus requirement to the point that "foreseeability "ofuse or consumption of the product in the place of habitual residence or injury would be enough even if neither the particular product nor products of that type were marketed there in the ordinary channels of trade. 166 The considerations that favour application ofthe law ofthe place where the product was initially distributed respond to many of the classic conflicts values emphasized by La Forest G. in Tolofson, 167 including decisional uniformity, forum-neutrality and facilitation of interprovincial and international commerce.168 Predictability would be enhanced because the rule avoids the uncertainties that would inevitably be encountered in interpreting more openended defendant nexus tests ("same orsimilarproducts," "ordinarycommercial channels" and thenotoriously slippery "foreseeability" of consumption or use). National legislatures would have a greater incentive to create an optimal torts liability regime directed at local market goals, while manufacturers would be 164 In Weintraub's proposal, a sufficient nexus exists "ifthe defendant should have foreseenthat theproduct that caused the harm orthedefendant'sproducts of the same type would be available in the victim's habitual residence through commercial channels." Ibid. at 228 . The test under the Hague Convention is very similar: the law of the habitual residence of the victim or the place of injury, as the case may be, is inapplicable if the defendant "could notreasonably have foreseen that the product or [its] own products ofthe same type would be made available in that state through commercial channels ." Supra footnote 119 art. 7. Cavers goes even further. He advocates application of the law of any state, at the plaintiff's option, where the defendant's products might forseeably be presentregardless ofwhether they are distributed in that market . Supra footnote 120. 165 
Conclusion
At the close of the last century, territorial analysis dominated conflict of laws thinking . Private international law was seen as a branch of public international law, sharing a common concern with the values of comity and a common commitment to preserving the co-equal territorial sovereignty of countries and states . In the intervening years, this way of thinking has fallen into decline in commonlawjurisdictions. Thereis no`superlaw' vestingexclusiveprescriptive authorityinparticularstates overparticularclasses ofinterjurisdictionalactivities or events . Choice of law decisions are merely another form of expression of local policy and local standards ofjustice, unconstrained by external limits .
Today, territorial analysis is once again in ascendance in the area of choice of law in tort. Driven by a sense of dismay at the excessive bias towards local law solutions favouring local interests reflected in common law thinking everywhere, scholars, courts andlegislators are once again looking outward for external limits ontheterritorialreach oflocallaw, findingpotentialfor themwithin federalsystems in the constitution, and in the internationalrealm in the old idea of comity as an expression of the principle of co-equal territorial sovereignty.
This "neo-territorialism"differs, however, from the territorial approach to choice of law associated with traditional vested rights thinking . Rather than commanding immutable and mechanistic solutions to choice of law problems, territorialvalues inform the choice of law process, acting as an outer limit onthe assertion ofdomestic legal policy and providing a more solidfoundation forthe developmentofchoice-of-lawrules that strive forgreaterneutrality inbalancing the interests of the parties and connected states.
In the area ofproducts liability, territorial analysis succeeds in eliminating the single most complicating element from the choice of law equation -the reference to the manufacturer's home law -withoutimpinging onsubstantive justice principles. The remaining choice of law issues are identifiable and finite and for that reason manageable, even ifthere may remain room for reasonable disagreement in the details of their resolution. The fact that some areas of uncertainty necessarily remain should not lead us to reject the methodology. Instead we should see it as evidence of the flexibility of the new territorialism. After all, with global economic integration proceeding apace, manageable uncertainty is surely preferable to the anarchy inherent in the old lexfoci rule.
176
Supra part II(a) ofthis article. 177 This term is defined supra footnote 29.
